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Equity portfolio flows to developing  countries have increased sharply in magnitude  in
recent years.  Total equity flows to developing  countries were estimated to be $13.0 billion in
1992, quadruple that of three years earlier.
The increased importance  of direct equity purchases by foreigners in emerging stock
markets may in part be attributed to the progressive  removal of formal barriers by developing
countries on foreign participation  in their stock markets.  Many developing  countries have in
recent years removed  restrictions  on foreign  ownership,  liberalized  capital account  transactions,
and in general have made it easier for foreigners to access their markets.
This paper investigates  stock  performance  in emerging  markets  in relation to this increase
in their accessibility by foreign investors.  As a measure of the degree of accessibility by
foreigners to emerging markets stocks we use the investability  index created by the Emerging
Market Data Base (EMDB) of the IFC.  The IFC investability  indexes capture for each stock
the legal barriers to free access by foreigners (general  inflow or outflows  restrictions, general
or sector-specific  ownership restrictions, remittance restrictions, other exchange restrictions,
restrictions  on capital structure, etc.).  These indexes should thus be a good indicator of the
relative importance  of legal barriers across securities at a given point in time in one market or
across a number of markets, or of changes  in barriers over time.
To determine  if barriers in general (both  legal and other) are important, we test whether
16 emerging markets are segmented  from or integrated with the global equity markets, using
data for the 1989-1992  period.  Using the Stehle (1977) model, we reject the hypothesis  that
emerging markets are integrated  with world capital markets (for most emerging markets) and
fail to rLject  the hypotheses  that markets  are segmented  (for all emerging  markets). We interpret
this as evidence  that barriers curtailing  access by foreigners  to emerging  markets  in general have
been important.
We next investigate whether legal barriers to access--as captured by the invesmability
indexes  and distinct from other, informal barriers--are the main reason why emerging markets
are found to be segmented  from the global  equity markets for this period. We find, on a cross-
sectional  basis, that for most emerging markets there is a strong relationship  between a stock's
price-earnings  ratio (P/E-ratio)  and the investability  index of the stock, suggesting  that barriers
to access by foreigners  have a negative  impact  on stock prices and hence raise the cost of capital
of listed firms.  For four markets,  this result is robust to the inclusion  of the world bcta and the
uniqueness  of domestic stock market risk (the degree of international  spanning  of the domestic
market), factors which in theory should also play a role in determining  the effects of barriers.
This result is also not influenced  by the time-series  effects of general market price movements
as it is robust to a standardization  of the stocks' P/E-ratio with the emerging market's general
P/E-ratio.
A significant  negative relationship  between the investability  index and a stock's rate of
return is, however, only found for Jordan.  This is probably because the effects of changes inthe degree of access over time tend to obscure  the cross-sectional  relationship  between  a stock's
rate of return and its investability  index, as prices move  as a result of the (anticipation  of future)
removal of access barriers.Introduction
Equity portfolio flows to developing  countries have increased sharply in magnitude in
recent  years, especially  to the so called emerging countries.' Total equity flows to developing
countries  are estimated  to have been $13.0 biliion in 1992, quadruple  that of three years earlier
(Table 1).  Equity flows are quite concentrated  among a small group of emerging countries
(e.g., Latin America received about 60% of all equity flows to developing  countries in 1992).
Even though relatively still small for developing countries in aggregate (about 10% of the
aggregate net resource flows they received in  1992), these flows are an important source of
finance for some developing  countries.
Equity  flows have taken  place in a number  of forms: direct equity  purchases  by investors
in the host stock markets;  investments  through  country  funds; issue of rights on equities  held by
depository institutions (American  and Global Depository Receipts (ADRs and GDRs) 2;  and
direct foreign equity offerings. In the last three years equity flows have largely taken place
through DRs.  The volume of ADRs/GDRs  issued for equity claims of developing  countries  is
estimated to have been about $13.9 billion over 1989-1993  (first six months of 1993).'  Until
recently, (closed-end)  country funds were next in importance:  during 1989-1993,  new country
funds were created for developing countries with an aggregated size of $8.0 billion.  The
sharpest relative increase in the last few years has been direct purchases of equities: these are
estimated to have been about $5.8 billion in  1992, up from $0.8 billion in  1990, and were
second in importance  in 1991  and 1992.
The increased importance of direct equity purchases by foreigners on emerging stock
markets may  in part be attributed  to the progressive  removal  of barriers by developing  countries
on foreign participation in their stock markets.  Many developing countries have removed
restrictions on  foreign ownership, liberalized capital account transactions, improved their
accounting  and information  standards,  and in general have  made it easier for foreigners  to access
their markets (see further, for example, Mathieson  and Rc;as-Suarez (1993) and Reisen and
Fischer (1993)). Particularly  in Europe  and Latin America, many  countries  have now very few
or no restrictions on access by foreigners  to their markets and treat, in may respects, foreign
investors in the same way they do domestic  investors.
IThere is no universally  accepted definition of an emerging market.  Usually, emerging
markets are considered those developing countries which have a relatively well-functioning
domestic  stock  market. Here, the focus is on the stock  markets in the countries  the International
Finance Corporation  (IFC) tracks in its Emerging  Markets Data Base (EMDB).
2ADRs  and GDRs are receipts issued by  financial  intermediaries  in  industrial countries
against shares held in custody  by these intermediaries  in the developing  countries.
'This includes direct offerings on foreign capital markets by corporations in developing
countries outside the ADR/GDR structure (under Rule 144A in the US).  These have been
minimal, however.2
At the same time, retums on stock markets in emerging  countries have been high; for
example, the T1C  composite index for Latin America was up 294.2 percent over 1988-1992,
compared to ;08.4 percent for the S&P500. This may also have been a factor motivating the
larger inflows of foreign  equity. At the same time, however, the volatility  (standard  deviation)
of  rates of  return has also been high reaching, for example, more than 100 percent for
Argentina.
The increase of these equity flows to a number  of developing  countries  and the opening
up of their stock  markets raise a number  of issues. An important  one is what the effect has been
on the risk-return tradeoff in these markets of the removal  of barriers, i.e.,  how much has the
risk-return tradeoff changed. The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effect of barriers to
access by foreign  investors on stock prices and rates of return.
To answer  this question, we use the newly created  indexes  by the IFC Emerging  Markets
Data Base (EMDB) on the degree of foreign access or "investability.'  The IFC investability
index captures the barriers to  free access by  foreigners for each stock (general inflow or
outflows restrictions, general or sector-specific  ownership  restrictions, remittance restrictions,
other exchange  restrictions,  restrictions  on capital  structure, etc.).  These stock-specific  indexes
should thus be a good indicator of the relative importance  of barriers across securities  at a given
point in time in one market  or across a number  of markets,  or of changes in barriers over time.
Summarizing  our results, we find a positive relationship  between P/E-ratios and the
degree of access for almost all the countries.  For four out of the seven markets we study in
detail, this result is robust to the inclusion of the world beta and the degree of international
spanning  of the domestic market.  Only for Jordan and Mexico, however, is this result robust
to the inclusion  of the additional factor of the supply of stocks.  For the relationship  between
rates of return and the investability  index, we find evidence  of a negative  sign for only Jordan,
which is also less robust.  For other countries, we do not find that abnormal stock returns are
related in a systematic  fashion to a stock's investability  index.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section one presents an overview of possible
analytical frameworks. Section two describes  the data we use and provides some statistics  on
the rates of  return.  We then perform the Stehle (1978) test for market segmentation  or
integration for each market to investigate  whether these markets indeed show signs of being
segmented. Section three provides the empirical  results of these tests of market integration  and
market segmentation. We then  describe in the next section  the concept  of the investability  index
as developed  by the IFC and provide some statistics  on the investability  indexes.  Section five
perform the tests on the (cross-sectional  and time series) relationship  between  the P/E-ratio and
the abnormal rate of  return on an individual stock on  the one hand and the level of its
investability  index on the other hand and performs  some  robustness  tests. Section  six concludes.3
I.  Overview  of Possible  Analytical  Models
Tests Asswning No Barriers  Without barriers, international integration tests can be
performed  using  the various  international  asset  pricing  models  that  have  been  developed. Past
empirical  tests along these  lines specifically  concerned  with developing  countries--and  which
assume  no barriers--are,  for example,  Lessard  (1973,  1974),  Divecha,  Drach  and Stefek  (1992),
Bekaert  (1993), Buckberg  (1993),  Diwan, Errunza  and Senbet (1993b),  De Santis (1993),
Harvey (1993), and Tesar and Werner (1993).  All papers find that there are significant
diversification  benefits  available  from investing  in developing  countries.  Most  of these  tests,
however,  use a specific  asset  pricing  model  which  assumes  full integration. As a result,  one
doesn't  know  whether  these  diversification  beneflts  can  be achieved  in practice.
Tests  Assuming  Barriers Without  explicitly  incorporating  the type  and severity  of barriers
in an asset-pricing  model,  several  papers  have  investigated  market  integration  (or segmentation)
using  the test developed  by Stehle  (1977). The advantage  of the Stehle  methodology  is that it
allows  for tests of both full integration  and full segmentation.  Jorion  and Schwartz  (1986),
focussing  on interlisted  stocks,  reject  full  market  integration  between  Canada  and the US using
this test, something  which  they attribute  to legal  barriers. Mittoo  (1992)  investigates  the same
issue and finds segmentation  pre-1981,  but inttration  afterwards,  especially  for interlisted
stocks.
With  barriers,  assets  in different  markets  may  have  different  expected  rates  of return  even
when  their  risk characteristics  are the same. One  way  of testing  integration  in the presence  of
barriers  is to model  the barriers  explicitly,  derive the resulting  theoretical  equilibrium  asset
prices,  and  to verify  the model  using  actual  asset  prices. Following  Jorioti  and  Schwartz  (1986),
barriers  can  be classified  into  indirect  barriers,  arising  from  differences  in available  information,
transaction  costs, accounting  standards,  etc.; and legal barriers, arising from the different
judicial status of foreign and domestic  investors,  e.g.,  ownership  restrictions  and taxes.
Typically  only legal barriers  are incorporated  in asset pricing  models  as these  can easily  be
modelled  explicitly.'
Theoretical  models  here  are Black  (1974  and 1978),  Stulz  (1981),  and Errunza  and Losq
(1985  and '989).  For imperfectly  accessible  stocks  (i.e., access  up to a share  5 less than 1),
Eun and Janakiramanan  (1986)  and Stulz and Wasserfallen  (1992)  develop  models.  These
papers  find theoretical  "mispricing"  resulting  from  the barriers  given the specific  asset-pricing
model  used.  As expected,  the analytical  predictions  on asset pricing  with barriers crucially
depend  on the type  of market  segmentation.
There  are some  empirical  investigations  building  on these  models  for  industrial  countries.
Hietala  (1989)  investigates  the pricing  of individual  Finnish  stocks  which can be owned  by
'For these reasons, Bekaert  (1993)  employs  a non-parametric  approach  for testing  the
relationship  between  barriers  and measures  of market  integration.4
foreign as well as domestic  investors (unrestricted)  versus stocks which can only be owned by
domestic Investors (restricted).  Some other papers have applied these tests to developing
countries.  Errunza and Losq (1985) find tentative  empirical support fo. a hypothesis  of mild'
market segmentation.  Errunza, Losq and Padmanabhan  (1992)  find that  many emerging  markets
are neither completely  integrated with nor completely  segmented  from industrial countries.
For imperfectly accessible stocks, Stulz and Wasserfallen  (1992) test their model for
Swiss stocks and find that a relaxation  of investment  barriers lowers substantially  the value of
the shares available to  foreigners only relative to  the value of  the shares available to all
investors.  Bailey and Jagtiani (1992) use this model to  investigate differential pricing of
restricted  and unrestricted  stocks for Thailand. They find that cross-sectional  difference in the
severity of foreign ownership explains some of the variation in the premiums of unrestricted
shares over restricted shares, leading to a mildly segmented  capital  market.
II.  The  Data
The raw data we have cover 20 emerging  markets. The price and rate of return data are
generally  available from 1975 on.  Table 2 and 3 provide some basic statistics  for the rates of
return on the IFC indexes and other market data in these emerging ma.kets over the period
1989-1992. Annex 1 describes the criteria used for creating the indexes.
As can be observed from Table 2, the IFC indexes  have in general increased, for some
countries by multiple factors (e.g., Argentina). There is also a great variation in the market
capitalization  across countries.6 The rates of return in emerging markets are in general high,
but so are the standard deviations  (Table 3).  The highest rate of return is for Argentina, more
than 100% on an annual basis.  However, Argentina also has the highest standard deviation,
almost 130%, and the highest  range.  In general, the rates of return and standard  deviations  for
the emerging markets are much higher than those for the industrial countries.  Table 3 also
provides the skewness and kurtosis measures, which indicate that the rates of return are not
likely drawn from normal distributions. Jarque-Bera  tests for normality  bear this out: for most
markets it rejects normality (see further Claessens,  Dasgupta  and Glen, 1993).
Table 4 provides some cross-sectional  information  on the monthly rates of return of the
individual  stocks for each market (the methodology  used  for creating  the individual  stocks' rates
'Defined as a situation where the industrial  countries' security markets are well integrated
and developing  country investors can invest in all these (foreign) security markets but foreign
investors can not vice-versa invest in developing  countries.
6It is important to note that the IFC indexes  cover only a subset cf all stocks listed on the
various exchanges, varying between 39% (Turkey) and 90% (Colombia) in terms of market
capitalization.  Typically, because of its selection criteria, the IFC index will be weighted
towards the larger market capitalization  and more liquidly traded stocks.5
of return is described  in Claessens,  Dasgupta  and Glen, 1993). There is a great cross-sectional
variation in the monthly  rates  of return behavior. Autocorrelation  coefficients  likewise  vary over
a wide range.
m.  Test of Market  Segmentation
We first use the model  of Stehle  (1977), as also applied by Jorion and Schwartz  (1986),
Errunza, Losq and Padmanabhan  (1992) and Mittoo (1992), to investigate the hypothesis  of
market integration or segmentation  separately for each emerging market.  The Stehle model
assumes that the CAPM holds and that exchange  risk is not priced.  The test requires running
the following regressions.  First,  we project the rate of return of the domestic IFC market
indexes,  j,  =  1,...,  K, on the rate of return on a world portfolio index, here approximated  by
the Morgan Stanley Capital Internatioral (MSCI) World Index (the net dividends reinvested
series), to get the orthogonal  component  in the domestic  index (note that all time subscripts  are
omitted):
(1)  R, - "04 + &A  + Vi-w
where RP  is the rate of return on the index in market j,  R, is the rate of return of the world
index, and Vj., is the component  orthogonal to the projection  of Rj on R.
We then regress the world rate of return on the various IFC indexes' rates of return to
get the orthogonal  components  here.
(2)  R,  - 8  . + 8,jRj  + Vwj
where V,,j is the component  orthogonal  to the projection  of R, on Rj.
The Stehle test then involves two cross-section  tests, using the orthogonal components
of the regressions  (1) and (2). Under full integration,  the parameter (denoted  here by -y) on the
slope coefficients (denoted here by ,B,,,,) of  the individual stocks' rates of return on  the
orthogonal component  of the regression  of the local index on the world portfolio should not be
significantly  different from zero.  Under complete segmentation,  the parameter (denoted  here
by i2) on the slopes  coefficients  (denoted  here by O,B) of the individual  stocks' rates of return
on the orthogonal  component  of the regression  of  the world portfolio  on the local index should
not be significantly  different from zero.  In other words, assuming complete integration or
complete  segmentation,  equation  (3) or (4) should  hold for the return on stock i in market  j:6
(3)  E(R,) 'YO  + YIJPIJ.W  +YVJ W
(4)  E(R)  TIOJ  + 'ljP4j +112JP,,wJ
where  Rj is the return  on stock  i in market  j, i = 1, .. Nj, where  Nj  is the  number  of stocks  in
market  j.  Under complete  integration,  -Y2  = 0 and 1q2  O 0 and under complete  segmentation  ')2
=0  and 72  #  0.
Since we have  actual  rates  of return, we need  to decompose  the rates of return  in an
expected  component  and an unexpected  component.  Under  complete  integration:
(F  ~~~R4j  - E(,R,J  + Piv,w  [RW_E(?_w  +Pij_w  Vj_  + ,,j
Under  complete  segmentation:
(6)  Rj  E(Ri)  + ,j[Rj-E(Rj  + P 4w-, Vw-j  + ew
Substituting  equation  (3)  into (5)  and (4)  into (6)  we get two  equations  which  give  us the
empirical  model  under  market  integration  (7) and under  segmentation  (8), respectively:
(7)  R,J = YOjAl-_IP.)  + Y2jPij  w + PIj.wRw  + Pij-wVj-w  +  j
(8)  R,J =  jij  (lVP4)  +  n2jPiw- + PiR + P4w  JVw  + 8v
Estimating  these  equations  using  the two-pass  approach  often  used  in empirical  studies
of the traditional  asset-pricing  models  (see  Shanken,  1992)  is not straightforward  here since  the
,B's  are measured  with error--there  is thus  an errors-in-the-variables  problem--and  the cross-
section  equations  (7) and (8) are biased. To overcome  this problem,  cross-section  tests have
traditionally  been done using portfolios  of stocks,  in the expectation  that the formation  of
portfolios  will reduce  the measurement  error (the Fama-Macbeth  (1973)  method). Because  of
the limited  data we have here, this is difficult  (there  are few stocks  for each country  with
complete  data  on rates  of return,  on average  less  than  20). We  therefore  use the rates  of return
on the individual  stocks  directly.7
We use the  non-linear, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique, which is
asymptotically  efficient and equivalent to MLE (see further Gibbons, 1980 and 1982).? This
method is consistent, but may not have good small sample properties.  We therefore use all
securitics which are consistently  available in a given market over the 1989-1992  period.  We
estimate for each market N equations (N being the number of securities in the market) as a
system of equations  with cross-equation  restrictions  on the y and vl coefficients  in each market
and no restrictions on the ,-s  (except that they are constant over  time).  The estimation
technique allows  for  correction  of  heteroskedasticity across  stocks  and  exploits  the
contemporaneously  correlated  errors.  The parameter estimates  and other statistics  are in Table
5.
The R2s for the segmentation  and integration tests (last column) vary between 0. 18
(Jordan) and 0.74  (Nigeria) and are of  similar magnitude (by country) for the  two tests
(reflecting the fact that the two systems are basically run with the same set of fundamental
variables). The integration  hypothesis  is rejected at the 5% level for 10 out of the 16 countries
for which we have consistent  data.'  The segmentation  hypothesis  is not rejected at the 5%
level for all countries and at the 10% level for only three countries (India, Korea and the
Philippines).  For  two countries, the  segmentation test  did not converge (Colombia and
Malaysia). Combining  the two tests, market  integration  can and market  segmentation  cannot  be
rejected (at the 5% level) for eight countries (Brazil, Greece, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, the
Philippines,  Taiwan and Thailand). For six countries neither market segmentation  nor market
integration  can be rejected (Chile, India, Jordan, Nigeria, Venezuela  and Zimbabwe),  possibly
indicating  a low power of our test.
The results of these estimation  techniques  can be compared  with the results for Canada-
US: Jorion and Schwartz  (1986)  find strong  evidence  of market segmentation;  and Mittoo  (1992)
finds  evidence of market segmentation  for the pre-1981  period, but integration for the post-1981
period.  For developing  countries, Errunza, Losq and Padmanabhan  (1992), using IFC EMDB
data over the 1976-1987  period, reject complete market integration for all eight developing
countries they study and reject complete market segmentation  for five (Brazil, Chile, Greece,
Korea and Mexico)  of these eight countries. They conclude  that "mild" segmentation  describes
the market structure for these five countries best.  Compared to their results, we find that
relatively  fewer countries  are not integrated  (10 out of 16 compared  to 8 out of 8), but more are
'We use the SAS routine SYSNLIN  (version 5.0) for the NLSUR.  Other approaches  are
the MLE method  of Litzenberger-Ramaswamy  (1979); the procedure  outlined  in Gibbons  (1980);
and the odd/even instrumental  variable approach  of Mankiw and Shapiro (1986).  We did use
the odd/even method but this method had a lower power as it could neither reject market
segmentation  nor integration for any of the countries.
'Data for individual  stock  rates of return are missing  for Argentina  for all years; for Turkey
and Indonesia,  data were only available  since 1987  and 1990  respectively;  for Portugal no stock
has consistently  data available for the 1989-1992  period.8
segmented  (14 out of the 14 markets  which  converged  compared  to theirs  5 out of 8).
It is worth  noting  that the overall  fit of both cross-section  equation  (5) as well as (6)
improves  over time.'  The fact that both the complete  segmentation  model  as well as the
complete  integration  model describe  the cross-sectional  behavior  of retums better as time
progresses  is somewhat  puzzling.  A priori, we  expected  that  the integration  model  would  have
performed  better  over time--as  countries  opened  up--and  the segmentation  model  worse.  One
explanation  is that both equations  essentially  use the same set of explanatory  variables,  world
and local rates  of return, and  consequently  that the behavior  over time  of the overall  fit has to
be similar.
IV.  Barriers and the Investability Indexes
This section  provides some statistics  on the investability  indexes.  Barriers to access by
foreigners  are more severe for developing  countries  than for industrial  countries. While many
developing  countries have liberalized  in recent years, many of these countries  have had in the
past--and  some still have--capital  controls affecting  the general ability to invest in and repatriate
capital out of the host country, restrictions on foreign investment (e.g., restrictions on the
general permissible  share of foreign  ownership),  and other  sector or companv-specific  ownership
restrictions.
In addition  to these legal barriers, other barriers likely limit foreigners' access to these
markets.'°  The IFC investability  indexes are,  however, only concerned  with legal barriers
In particular, the investability  indexes  are compiled  on the basis of information  on type (and/or
changes)  of identifiable  barriers (in or out, ownership restrictions,  remittance  restrictions,  other
foreign exchange restrictions, restrictions on capital structure, etc.).  Typically, however, the
index reflects the share of stocks  which  can be held by foreigners,  i.e., the 5-constraint. Indirect
'We first estimate the cross-section  equations  (5) and (6) for every month during the period
Deceinber 1988-December  1992, where we use estimates  of the various betas obtained from
using the previous three years of data (instead  of running  it as systems  with constant  betas). We
then measure the degree of improvement  over time in overall fit for each country through  the
correlations of the R 2s of the cross-section  equations with an index which runs from 1 (first
cross-section  equation) to 49 (last  cross-section  equation). For both equation  (5) and (6), 14 out
of the 16 correlations  are positive (of which 6 significantly  so at the 5% level).
'"For example, there can be restrictions imposed  on investors by the home country (e.g.,
restrictions on the share of  foreign assets held by pension funds) and other regulatory and
accounting standards in  the home country.  Also, indirect barriers may exist, such as: the
efficiency of  the domestic stock (and other financial) markets; thc regulatory, accounting,
enforcement, etc. standards in the host country; the different forms of sovereign  (or transfer)
risk; taxes (see Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga (1993)) and other transaction  costs.  We do not
analyze these restrictions.9
barriers are not incorporated  in the index (even though the IFC categorizes  the severity of these
indirect  barriers by market, see  the IFC Emerging  Markets  Factbook, 1993). Annex 3 describes
the method  used for creating  the investability  indexes  and the restricdons  in place as of end-1992
for some selected  emerging markets.
The investability  indexes  are available since December, 1989, initially for 10 of the 20
markets in the EMDB and later for 18.  The investability  indexes take on values between 0.0
(complete  lack  of access by foreigners)  and 1.0 (complete  access). Table 6 provides information
(the number  of stocks, mean level, the standard  deviation, the range, and the skewness  of the
indexes)  on the cross-sectional  distributions  of the investability  index within a given country, at
different  points in time. Figure 1  provides the time-series  plots for the mean and cross-sectional
standard deviation  for the seven countries  which have consistent  data for the investability  index
and the stock rates of return since 1989 (Chile had missing  data for 1991 and could thus not be
plotted).  As can be observed  from the figure and also by comparing  the three panels of Table
6, there arc sharp movements  over time in the degree to which foreigners can access these
markets. For Mexico, for example, the index  goes up from an average  of 0.10 in January 1989
to 0.61 at the end of 1992  and further to 0.80 in March 1993. Similarly,  the average for Brazil
goes up from 0.18 to 0.53.
The cross-section  standard deviation  of the index at the end of 1992  varies greatly, from
0.00 for Taiwan to 0.51 for Colombia,  Greece and Venezuela. In general, the cross-sectional
standard deviation is lower in Asia (even though less so for Pakistan, the Philippines and
Malaysia), an indication that these countries have mostly market-wide, not sector- or stock-
specific  restrictions.
The time-series  plots of the cross-section  variation and Table 7 show that the European
and Latin American countries have seen the greatest variation over time in the mean index
(STDMN in Table 7  is higher for European, except Jordan, and Latin American, except
Venezuela,  countries). Asian countries  have the least variation over time. Taking into account
also the low cross-sectional  variation  in Asian countries,  this reflects that those Asian countries
which opened  up durirg this period did so in a market-wide  fashion. There are altogether four
markets which have little time-series  variation  in access (i.e., for which in Table 7 STDMN s
0.04), but a reasonable  cross-sectional  variation (i.e., for which, according to Table 6, STD 2
0.16 at any point in  time and for which we have complete data on  rates of  return and
investability  indexes): Jordan, Malaysia, the Philippines,  and Thailand.  Of these four, Jordan
has the lowest mean index; 0.09 at the end of 1992.10
V.  Tests of the Relationship between the Investability Indexes, P/E-ratios, and Rates
of Return
So far, we have found evidence  of market segmentation  for about 10 markets. We now
proceed to incorporate barriers more formally  in our empirical tests, using the models  of Eun
and Janakiramanan (1986) and Stulz and Wasserfallen (1992), and the application of these
models by Bailey and Jagtiani (1992).  We start with the assumption that the world and the
emerging country have the  same numeraire (dollars) so that exchange risk is  not priced.
Consequently,  we focus on the dollar rates of return.  We further assume tLht  the residents  of
the emerging countries have full access to foreign financial  markets and foreign stocks.  The
high levels of  flight capital observed for many developing  countries indicate that this is a
reasonable  assumption. Foreigners are, however, restricted from full access to the emerging
markets and can only invest up to a fraction S measured  by the investability  index.
When  the  b-constraint is  binding,  two  prices  for  the  same  security  will  occur:  a
"domestic"  price for that share of the stock which can only be held by domestic  residents and
a "foreign' price for the share of the stock which can be held by both foreigners and domestic
residents.  Compared to a situation  with no restrictions  a discount can arise for the domestic
price and a premium for the foreign  price.  The ratio of foreign  to domestic  prices will, among
others, depend on  the supply of  both classes of  shares, reiative to  domestic and foreign
investors' wealth.
Apart from the fact whether the constraint on ownership  is binding on the foreigners--
which we assume it is,  the degree to which the domestic market offers unique risk-return
characteristics  from a world capital market  point of view plays an important  role in determining
the existence  and size of the discount and premium. If the domestic market can be mimicked
perfectly using world assets, then foreigners  will not be willing  to pay a premium for emerging
markets' stocks. And if domestic residents  can lay off the risk of t1heir  emerging market stocks
through positions in stocks available in the world capital markets, then they do not require a
discount on emerging markets stocks, even if they are forced to hold them because of the 5-
constraint.  "
We test these relationships  using individual  stocks' P/E-ratios and rates of return for the
"Notice that this approach resembles  segmentation/integration  tests where the residual of a
projection of the local return on the world return (and vice-versa)  was used.  Here the local
index is  mimicked more generally using (in principle) all worldwide traded assets.  Since
barriers and associated  'mispricing" of individual  securities  can affect  the overall  domestic  stock
market, (announcements  of) barriers on individual  securities  can lead to a market wide effect
through 'spill-over" effects (see further Eun, Claessens and Jun, 1993). We do not attempt  to
control for these effects.11
seven countries  for which  we have consistent  data on returns and investability  indexes." 2 Since
we are not studying unrestricted  and restricted shares of the same firm, but rather shares of
individual  firms which  vary in degree of restrictiveness,  we cannot  calculate the ratio of foreign
to  domestic prices  here.' 3 However, we can  study the price-earning ratio of  a  stock.
Similarly,  we can use domestic  rates of return (instead  of the difference  between the returns to
foreign and domestic  shareholders).
We estimate mimicking  portfolios  on the basis  of the IFC-index  for the emerging market
and the MSCI-indexes  for 13 industrial countries.  Specifically,  the mimicking  portfolios are
created through OLS-regressions  of (the rates of return on) the indexes on (the rates of return
on) the 13 MSCI-indexes. We then use the predicted values from this regression as the rates
of return on the mimicking  portfolio."  As in Stulz and Wasserfallen (1992) and Bailey and
Jagtiani (1992), we also include in the estimations  a size (or supply)  variable, here taken as the
log of the market capitalization  of each stock, MVi,,. Finally, we use actual instead  of expected
P/E-ratios or returns.
We thus model the P/E-ratio, or alternatively, the (excess)  rate of return of domestic
stock i in market  j, as:
(9)  (P/E)i/ = a0.,  + al,,8t +  C2.tw1}
+  3jAjJf  - kj)  +  "4;MViJ  ++  c
where 6j  , indicates  the share foreigners  can buy of a particular  stock i at time t (the investability
index), 0,j  is the slope coefficient  of stock i on the world portfolio (here the MSCI world
index),  ,B,i  is the slope coefficient  of stock i on the mimicking  portfolio A,  j;, is the slope
coefficient  of stock  i on the local market index j (note that the as are not stock specific), and
where  the subscript  t for the 1,-coefficients  indicates  that these  are estimates  updated  every month
using the previous three years of data.  The difference between  j,ij  and ,B,j represents the
domestic risk that cannot be hedged through positions in  foreign assets.  When there is no
residual risk to bear, OBM  - ,,j  = 0 and the world CAPM prevails.  To estimate the betas, we
'2The results for 7 other countries  are available  upon request.
'3Even though we have some stocks  of the same firm (e.g., Telmex shares A, B, C and L)
which  differ in degree of investability,  the sample  of such stocks is small. Other foreign  prices
are available  in the form of country-fund  and ADRs prices.  For an analysis of country-fund
prices, see Hardouvelis,  La Porta and Wizman  (in this volume) and Diwan, Errunza and Senbet
(1993a and 1993b).
"The mimicking  is, as expected,  generally  poor  as these  markets have  a low correlation  with
markets of industrial  countries. The residual domestic  risks are consequently  quite large.12
regress the rates of return during the three year period preceding the date on the respective
indexes.
The coefficients  a,,, depend  on the relative risk aversion, the wealth  of both foreign and
domestic  investors  and the total supply  of restricted  and unrestricted  shares. The prior is, when
the access constraint is binding, that the coefficients  al,  are positive (an increase in 5 relaxes
the foreign constraint, decreases the required rate of return and increases the P/E-ratio).  The
coefficients  a2, represent the world market price of risk and are expected to be negative. The
coefficients a3  t  are expected to be negative as a decrease in the ability to mimic local risk
increases the required rate of return and lowers the P/E-ratio.  Finally, a4, are expected to be
positive  as an increase  in the supply  of assets, keeping  liquidity  constant,  raises the required rate
of rewurn  and lowers the P/E-ratio.  When using the rate of return as the dependent  variable,
the signs of the a-coefficients  are expected to take the opposite  value.
We do not impose time-series  restrictions  on the coefficients  a0,-a4, 1 for each market,
i.e., we do not use the SUR-technique  we used for the integration/segmentation  tests.  Rather
we employ the Fama-MacBeth  (1973)  methodology  where we estimate  a separate  cross-section
equation  for each month in the 1989-1992  period for each market and then calculate averages,
standard deviation, etc. of the time series of the slope coefficients.
The results for the P/E-ratio alone are in the first panel of Table 8 which reports the
means of the slope coefficients, the t-value for the time-series means, and the means of the
individual  t-values. The other panels  cover the results when we include different combinations
of the other right-hand side variables. The results for the rates of return are in Table 9.
The results for regressions  of the P/E ratios on the index alone confirm the notion that
the P/E ratio is positively related to the degree of access by foreigners, suggesting  that barriers
to access have a negative impact on prices.  As measured by the t-value for the mean slope
coefficient, for all  seven countries, the mean slope is  significantly positive (with Brazil
marginally). When including  other explanatory  variables, we find that the positive sign for 6
is robust to the inclusion of the world beta and the degree of international  spanning of the
domestic market for four markets.  Only for Jordan and Mexico, is the positive sign for a
maintained  across all regression  specifications. For the other countries the sign for a  turns at
times negative, e.g., when including  the lagged  (log) market  value, the third panel. For Jordan,
the signs for the other explanatory  variables  are not always as expected,  e.g.,  several  of the ,Bs
have positive signs.  In case of Mexico, the signs for the ,Bs  are as hypothesized  all negative
(e.g., see the very last line of Table 8).
The t-values for the time-series  means show that there are quite a number  of significant
coefficients. For example, for the regression  which includes  all explanatory  variables (the last
panel of Table 8),  14 out of 28 coefficients  are significant  on the basis of the t-values for the
mean (the mean of  the individual t-values shows, however, that many of  the individual
regression coefficients  were insignificant). But, the signs are often not as expected.13
For the rates of return, Jordan is the only country which has the expected negative sign
for a (first panel, Table 9).  This negative  sign is robust, but loses significance,  when including
#,, and ftj-0,, which themselves  also have the expected  positive and often significant  signs. The
negative  sign for a disappears  when the lagged (log) market value is included. For none of the
other markets do we find that returns are negatively related to the investability indexes in a
consistent  fash.on.
The degree to which the model  explains  the cross-section  variation in the P/E-ratios and
rates of retums varies greatly across equations  and countries.  While in general we have low
explanatory  power, with the time-series  mean of the adjusted R2s reaching mostly less than 10
percent, at times the mean adjusted  R2 reaches 70 to 80 percent (figures  are not reported).
Our findings  may  be better understood  by referring back  to Figure 1. This figure showed
that there is much erratic behavior in the investability  indexes, with large swings from month
to month for some countries, e.g., for Greece in late 1990 the mean index falls in one month
from 0.77 to 0.57 and then goes back up to 0.75, casting some doubt on the manner in which
these data were constructed. More importantly, as was noted before, only for Jordan is the
mean index stable and low, while at the same time displaying  a relatively  large cross-sectional
variation.
The behavior of the indexes may explain why we only find consistent  results for both
P/E-ratios and rates of return for Jordan. For three of the four countries  where the investability
index was stable while still displaying relatively large cross-sectional variation, the access
constraint likely did not bind (Malaysia, Philippines  and Thailand). This implied  one wouldn't
expect a cross-sectional  relationship  between  returns and the indexes.  For the other countries,
the investability  indexes  were not stable (the mean  increased for Brazil and Mexico and bchaved
erraticly for Greece). This could imply that time-series  effects (of opening  up or closing  of the
markets, or of data problems)  complicated  the cross-sectional  relationship  between returns and
the investability  indexes.  Or put differently, the ex-post rates of return are probably a poor
proxy of the ex-ante rates of return.  A positive relationship  between the P/E-ratio and the
investability  indexes  could still  be maintained  if countries  opened  up (e.g., Brazil  and Mexico),
however, since then both the cross-sectional  and time-series  effects would go the same way.
To control for the times-series  effects of market-wide  liberalization,  we standardize  the
P/E-ratio  of each stock  in a given market by dividing  it by the market-average  P/E-ratio. In this
way, we control for changes  in the P/E-ratio of each stock  for market-wide  developments  which
may be related to the opening up of the market.  Admittedly,  this is a crude way of proxying
for events which affect a particular stock's P/E ratio over time, but it should provide some
indication  of how robust our results are to the dme-series behavior of the P/E-ratios.
The results are reported in Table 10. Comparing  the coefficients  in Table 10 with those
of Table 8, we find that the cross-sectional  relationship  between a stock's P/E-ratio and its a is
robust to this standardization. While, as expected, the slope-coefficients  drop significantly,  the
t-values are  not affocted.  If anything, the cross-sectional effect of  a  on the P/E-ratio is14
significant  at higher levels than in Table 8.  By multiplying  the slope  coefficients  with the mean
level of a (from Table 7), the relative sensitivity  of a stock's P/E-ratio with respect to 6 can be
compared across countries.  Excluding  Thailand (which has a very low slope coefficient), the
mean sensitivity  is 0.91, with a standard deviation  of only 0.44, indicating  some evidence  of a
common  pattern.
We also perform a second rot ustness  test.  This involves controlling  for the economic
sector to which the stock belongs."  Our previous  results may be capturing  differences  in P/E-
ratios by industry to the extent that foreign ownership restrictions differ systematically  by
industry.  Since we have often a limited number of stocks for each country, we cannot control
for each industry without running  out of degrees of freedom. We therefore classify stocks in
two groups: non-banks  and banks.  Ownership  restrictions  appear to differ most systematically
between these two groups. We perform this second robustness  test for two countries, Malaysia
and Brazil.  Malaysia has 23 stocks in the non-banking  group and 6 in banks.  The non-banks
group has a much higher a  (100%) than the banks group (30%): the P/E ratio for non-banks  is
on average  about twice as high as the P/E-ratio of the bank stocks. Average rates of return do
not differ between  the two  groups. Brazil has 15 stocks  in non-banks  and only 3 in banks.  The
P/E ratio for non-banks  is on average  slightly  higher as that of banks, but average  rates of return
do not differ between the two groups.
The results of similar regressions  as in Tables 8-10 but now with a dummy added for
sector (non-banks = 0, banks =  1), are reported in Table 11.  As can be observed, for both
countries and for the P/E-ratio as well as for the rate of return equations, the sector dummies
have the right (negative)  sign, indicating  that the industry classification  affects a stock's P/E-
ratio.  For Malaysia, however, the dummies  are never significant,  while for Brazil only three
out of eight are  significant in case of the P/E-regressions and none for the rates of return
regressions.  (Note, however, that there are only three stocks in the Brazil banks group.)
Introducing  the sector dummy  does affect the other slope  coefficients,  however. In particular,
for Malaysia  the t-statistics  for S become  insignificant  for almost  all specifications. For Brazil,
on the other hand, t-statistics  often improve.  For Malaysia, this raises the possibility  that the
regressions on  the  P/E-ratio on  a  without sector  dummy are  misspecified because of
multicollinearity  between a  and sector (i.e., sector-specific  factors other than a  determine a
stock's P/E-ratio in such a way that high  a  sectors  end up with high P/E-ratios and vice-versa).
As we use no factors other than a  and sector-dummy  to control for a stock's P/E-ratio, we
cannot determine conclusively  either way whether is it the sector or the level of a  which is
driving the relationship  between 6 and P/E-ratio.  In case of Brazil, there is no evidence of a
coincidence  between the industry sector of a stock  and its 6.
The negative  results for the rates of return are consistent  with Bekaert  (1993). He finds
that there is not a significant  relationship  between  ownership restrictions  and the integration  of
an emerging market with world markets.  He conjectures that ownership restrictions  are not
"We are grateful to Donald Lessard for suggesting  this extension.15
binding or are being circumvented.
VI.  Conclusions
Tests of  market integration using the  Stehle (1977) model, employing nonlinear,
seemingly  unrelated  regressions  (equivalent  to MLE), reject the market integration hypothesis
for most of the emerging  markets that were examined  and fail to reject segmentation  for all the
markets. In particular, Brazil, Greece, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines,  Taiwan and
Thailand are found to be segmented  from international  markets.
We have evidence that the degree of investability  affects P/E-ratios for seven countries
in the expected way.  We find this result to be robust for four markets when two additional
explanatory  variables were added to the regression  equation, and for two, Jordan and Mexico,
when three additional  variables were added. It is also robust to the standardization  of the P/E-
ratios.  When using rates of return, only Jordan yielded the expected results.
The weak relationship  between rates of return and the investability  indexes is probably
because  we cover time-series  as well as cross-section  effects. On a cross-sectional  basis alone,
one would expect stocks which are more accessible to have lower return.  However, many
markets  have become  more accessible  to foreign  investors over time and as a result stock prices
have  increased, implying  that ex-post returns have  been high (even though  expected  returns may
have declined).  This implies that on a cross-sectional basis one may not find a negative
relationship  between  a stock's return and its investability  index. The other  possibility,  of course,
is that the CAPM is not the right model to use.
Our results indicate two possible  avenues for future research: one, the degree of access
over time should be kept constant; and two, the model could be expanded to test for the
importance  of the investability  indexes in explaining differences  in the rate of return across
stocks.16
Annex 1: General  criteria for Inclusion  In the IFC Indexes'
IFC selects stocks for inclusion in  the indexes on the basis of  three criteria: size,
liquidity, and industry. The indexes  include the largest and most actively traded stocks  in each
market, with a target index total representing the top 60% of total market capitalization  at the
end of each year and, as a second step, the top 60% of total trading value during each year.
Size is measured  by market  capitalization;  liquidity  is the total value of shares traded during the
year.
Only stocks that are listed on one of the major exchanges  in the emerging markets are
included  in the index. The index will not include stocks  whose issuing  company  is headquartered
in an emerging market but listed only on foreign markets.
If several stocks meet the liquidity  and size criteria, but only one or two are needed, IFC
selects the stocks that represent industries  that are not yet well represented  in the IFC index.
In a few instances,  particularly  where multiple  classes  of stocks  are common  (e.g., Brazil
and Mexico), IFC may include in the IFC index more than one class of stock for the same
company  even though they  are not necessarily  actively  traded. The purpose is to give a balanced
view of the capitalization  of companies  that have other classes of stock that are actively traded.
Stock market "float'  (i.e., the amount of issued stock held by the general public and
generally  assumed  to be available  for trading) is not a consideration  in weighing  the indexes, due
to the difficulty  of obtaining  accurate information  in a timely manner.
'This annex and annex 2 is copied from the IFC methodology  notes.17
Annex 2:  Criteria  used by the IFC for the Investable  Indexes  and restrlctions  on foreign
investors  in selected countries
Criteria  used by the IFC for the lnvestable  Indexes
As a first screen, stocks are included in the investable  indexes if they are in the global
index (see below)  and are available  for purchase by non-resident  investment  institutions  to some
degree; the degree is determined  by national  laws and by company  statutes. Governments  and
companies  impose a variety of restrictions on foreign ownership, which may also differ by
sector.  In addition, individual firms may restrict foreign ownership of (certain classes of)
shares. Several examples  are shown here; Annex 2 summarizes  the restrictions in effect at the
end of 1992  for some selected markets.
General national  limits, such as "foreigners  as a group may not own more than 10% of
any company.'
Special class of shares, such as A and B class shares in the Philippines. The two are
equivalent  except that foreigners may not own A class shares;
Sector restrictions, most commonly used to  limit  foreign ownership of  financial
institutions, energy producers, utilities, and the media;
Single  foreign holder limitations  on general classes  of shares, such as Brazil's 'no more
than 5% of the voting classes, nor more than 20% of aggregate  capital" or Colombia's
10% limit per investor. The IFC rule in this regard is to use the aggregate  that foreign
investors as a whole may acquire.
Example:  In Colombia,  foreigners  may  own 100% of most  companies,  although  no single
foreigner may own more than 10%. The investable market capitalization would be
considered as 100%.
"Foreign  Board"  adjuncts to the main stock  exchange, where foreign  investors may trade
listed stocks among themselves,  assuring that trades conducted  there will not cause the
foreign ownership  content to exceed maximum  permitted levels.
Prohibitions on individual foreign investors while permitting multiple foreign mutual
funds, if they meet certain criteria, such as minimum  fund size and experience.  The IFC
rule in this regard is to consider the market as open as it is to authorized  investors, using
the "aggregate  investor" rule noted above for individual  stock investability  factors.
Company  statutes that impose limits that differ from national law in some markets. In
those cases, IFC uses the most restrictive limit.
Example: The national  limit is 49  % but a company's articles  of incorporation  set a limit18
of 25 %. IFC would use a weight of 25  %.
National limits on the aggregate  permitted foreign investment. For example, Taiwan,
China set a ceiling  of US$2.5 billion  on foreign  inflows  when it opened  its stock market
in  January  1991. At  the  end of  1992, this represented about 2.5%  of  total TSE
capitalization.  In this case, IFC would apply the relative shares of the available stocks
within the market against the aggregate  limit.
Example: The national limit in a market is $1 billion, and the investable  index in the
market consists of two stocks, XYZ Inc. and ABC Corp., which have available market
capitalizations of $2  billion and $500 million, respectively. In  the absence of  the
aggregate limit, the investable index would use $2 billion and $500 million as the
available market capitalization.
However, these amounts  would exceed  the limit, and IFC would  apply the relative share
approach: two stocks  represent 80% and 20% of the available market capitalization,  so
the investable index would use $800 million and  $200 million as  the two stocks'
"available" market capitalization.
For the calculation  of the various IFC price and rate of return indexes, the investable
market capitalization  of each stock is used for its weight  in the index instead  of the stock's total
market capitalization.
Example: XYZ, Ltd. has  total market capitalization  of $100 million but national  law
prohibits foreign ownership of more than 49% of a company. The IFC Global Index
would use the full $100 million  as the stock's maxket  capitalization  while the Investable
Index would use only $49 million.
To take concerns regarding illiquidity or  relatively small market capitalizations  into
account, the IFC excludes stocks from the investable  indexes if:
1) trading value for the year totals less than $10 million, using total trading value unweighted
for foreign access;
2) the investable  market capitalization  is less than $25 million. An exception  occurs when the
investable capitalization  is small but the trading is large. IFC will not exclude a stock if the
value traded  exceeds $  1  00 million  for the year, regardless  of the stock's investable  capitalization.
Example. A stock in Korea has a total capitalization  of $240 million  and trading  totaling
$1,300 million for the year. With the  10% limit currently in effect in  Korea, the
investable  capitalization  is only $24 million. It is clearly an accessible, large and liquid
stock, and foreigners  are unlikely  to have difficulty  in trading it.
In rare cases, the selection  screens  could produce fewer than five stocks  in an investable19
market, which is insufficient  for an index. If that happens, IFC will select as many stocks as
needed  to reach the minimum  of five stocks, using investable  capitalization  ranked in decreasing
order by size.
Restrictions on foreign lnvestors at the end of 1992 in selected countries
Argentina  The market is considered generally 100% investable; some corporate statute
limitations  apply.
Brazil  The market  is considered  generally  investable;  since  May 1991  foreign  institutions
may own  up  to  49%  of  voting common stock and  100% of  non-voting
participating  preferred stock. Some  corporate statute limitations  (e.g., Petrobras
common  are off-limits)  apply.
Chile  Foreign  portfolio investment  is considered to enter Chile through  Law 18657  of
1987  regarding  Foreign Capital  Investment  Funds, which  limits aggregate  foreign
ownership to 25% of a listed company's shares.
Colombia  The market is considered 100% investable  from February 1, 1991.
Greece  The market is generally 100% investable.
India  A press note issued by the Ministry of Finance of the Government  of India on
September 14, 1992, announced that foreign institutional  investors (FIIs) could
henceforth  invest in all listed securities in both primary and secondary markets.
FIls are required to register with the Securities and Exchange Board of India
before making any investment.  The market is considered effectively  open from
November 1, 1992.
Investments  are subject to a ceiling of 24% of issued share capital for the total
holdings  of all registered FlIs and 5% for the holding  of a single FII in any one
company. The ceiling includes the conversion of fully and partly convertible
debentures  issued by the company.
Indonesia  Until December  1987, the market  was closed to foreign  investment.  In December
1987, the govemment  introduced  deregulation  measures  that allowed foreigners
to purchase shares in eight non-joint  venture companies.  On September  16, 1989,
the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia issued Decree Number
1055/KMK.013/1989,  which allowed foreigners to purchase up to 49% of all
companies' listed shares, including foreign  joint ventures but excluding banks.
The Bank  Act, 1992, enacted  on October 30, 1992, allowed foreigners  to invest
in up to 49% of the listed shares in three categories  of banks - private national,
state and joint foreign. Currently  only private national banks are listed.20
In  a  few markets, such as Indonesia, companies do  nc'  list all  the shares
outstanding.  For  its indexes, IFC counts only the shares listed at the stock
exchange.
Jordan  The market is considered  generally  49% investable.
Korea  Since January 1, 1992, authorized  foreign  investors  have been allowed  to acquire
up to 10% of the capital of listed companies; some corporate statute limitations
apply (e.g., POSCO & KEPCO 8%, and some are permitted up to 25%). The
10% limit applies separately  to common  and preferred stock. Under the revised
regulations of June 22, 1992, effective in July 1992, companies  whose foreign
holdings  already exceeded 10% could apply to Korea's Securities  and Exchange
Commission  to increase their limit to 25%. As of March 1993, four companhcs
had received  permission:  Korea Electronic  Parts, Korea  Long-Term  Credit Bank,
Trigem Computer and Young Chang Akki. The ceiling automatically  declines
when foreign-held  shares are sold to domestic  investors.
Malaysia  The limit on foreign ownership of Malaysian stocks is subject to some debate.
Bank Negara, the central bank, restricts the ownership of banks and financial
institutions  by foreigners to 30%.  However, these limits do not appear to be
strictly enforced.  Under the Banking and Financial  Institutions  Act, 1989, the
approval  of the Minister of Finance is required before foreign investors  can buy
or sell shares of a licensed  bank or ..nance company  amounting  to 5% or more.
Certain non-bank  stocks have different foreign share holding limits for tax and
other reasons.  These are MISC, Proton, Telekom, Tenaga Nasional, Tai Wah
Garments and Yantzekiang.  All other stocks are  open to  foreign portfolio
investment  without  any limits. However, the approval  of the Foreign Investment
Committee is required for acquiring 15% or more of the voting power of a
company  by any one foreign  interest and for acquiring the assets or interests of
a company when they exceed M$5 million, whether by Malaysian or foreign
interests.  Except for a few specific  cases, IFC uses 100% for most stocks and
30% for banks and financial  institutions.
Mexico  Foreign portfolio investment is permitted in designated classes of shares, and
since May 1989 in most other shares through the use of  the Nafinsa Trust
arrangement. It is now considered  generally 100% investable,  except for banks,
where foreign ownership  is restricted  to 30%.
Nigeria  Closed to foreign  investment.
Pakistan  The market is considered 100% investable  from February 22, 1991.
Philippines  National law requires that a minimum  of 60% of the issued shares of domestic
corporations should be owned by Philippine nationals. To ensure compliance,21
Philippine  companies  typically  issue two classes of stock: "A"  shares, which may
be traded  only among  Philippine  nationals,  and "B" shares, which may be traded
to either Philippine  nationals  or foreign investors and which usually amount to
40% of the total.  Mass media, retail trade and rural banking companies are
closed to foreign investors.
Portugal  The market is considered generally 100% investable; some corporate statute
limitations  apply, particularly  regarding shares issued in privatizations.
Taiwan  The market was opened to  foreigners on  January 1,  1991, though foreign
investors must meet high registration requirements  and total cash inflows from
abroad  cannot  currently  exceed an official  ceiling  of $2.5 billion. There is a 10%
limit  on  aggregate  foreign  ownership  of  issued  capital.  The  domestic
transportation  industry  is closed to foreign investors.
Thailand  Various Thai laws restrict foreign shareholdings  in Thai companies  engaged in
certain areas of business. The Banking  Law restricts foreign  ownership in banks
to 49% The Alien Business  Law, administered  by the Ministry of Commerce,
restricts foreign ownership of stocks in specified sectors to 49%. In addition,
other laws provide  similar  restrictions  on foreign  ownership.  Restrictions  are also
faced by foreign investors through limits imposed by company by-laws which
range from 15  % to 65  %. The Foreign  Board was established  in 1988 to facilitate
trading in shares registered in foreign names.
Turkey  The market is considered 100% investable  from August 1989.
Venezuela  Non-financial  stocks are considered  generally 100% investable  from January 1,
1990, but  some restricted classes do  exist.  Bank stocks are  currently not
available.
Zimbabwe  Effectively  closed to foreign  investment  by virtue of severe exchange controls.22
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Table 1: Equity  Flows to Developing  Countries
(Millions  of doDars,  estimates)
Total
Type of flow  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993P  1989-93P
Country  Funds  $2.2  $2.9  $1.2  $1.3  $0.4  $8.0
ADRs/GDRs  - $0.1  $4.9  $5.9  $3.0  $13.9
Direct Equity  $1.3  $0.8  $1.5  $5.8  $1.8  $11.2
Total  $3.5  $3.8  $7.6  $13.0  $5.2  $33.1
Source  World Debt Tables (1993) and Gooptu (1993)
Notes: P  for the first six-months  of 1993.26
Table  2:  IFC  indexes and  other data  for  each market:  January  1989 and  December  199I (millions of US-dollars,  unless otherwise  noted)
IFC  IFC  IFC  IFC  IFC  IFC  TOTAL CTRY  STOCKS  INDEX  P/E  RATIO  P/HV  RATIO  MARKET  CAPIT.  VAL  TRADED  MARKET  CAPIT.  EXCH  RATE 89 92  1989  1992  1989  1992  1989  1992  1989  1992  1989  1992  1989  1992  1989  1992
ION  . 63  . 59.03  . 12.19  . 1.60  . 8661.31  . 259.65  . 12037.54  2063.50 IND  60 62  233.25 415.96  18.18 33.74  2.6  14.74  11624.16  25365.18  1068.88  . 2518.98  65118.90  15.16  28.68 KOR 61 91  730.26 518.61  38.46 21.43  2.75 1.06  54828.72 66461.02 5556.64  6006.51  94233.33  107447.97  660.00  788.40 KAL 62 62  134.12 226.89  36.52  21.84 2.30 2.53  20176.60 47940.53  188.03 M7.27  25175.59 94003.82  2.73  2.62 PAK  50 58  176.52 455.14 7.32  21.86 1.21 2.55  825.72  37M7.68  6.33  32.74  2427.11  8028.36  18.95  25.50 PHI 18 30 1526.25  2056.78  12.34  14.13 2.81 2.45 2590.98  8167.09  65.20  83.70  4123.46 13794.50  20.61  25.60 TAI  62 70  866.08 503.74  42.60  16.57 8.35 2.15  90820.99 60454.10  15156.36  3171.63  139174.36  101124.43  27.65  25.17 THA 29 51  376.89 900.42  12.83  13.93 2.15 2.52 6476.44 28368.39  321.99  1876.84  9875.27 58258.87  25.39  25.49
GRE 26 32  226.14 537.42  10.12  6.89  1.63 1.67 2289.03 5376.53  8.22  112.20  3922.75  9488.60 155.00  215.30 JOR 25 27  132.93 181.79  15.78 14.49  1.48 1.61 1697.46 1987.65  41.29  70.16  2320.86  3365.03  0.48  0.67 POR  23 30  637.84 503.06  15.05  9.05  2.77 1.02 4117.01 4867.61  14.57  52.25  6626.11  9213.36 152.47  146.92 TUR  18 25  134.41 227.01 2.26  6.95  1.48 1.29  718.91 3872.42  2.32  158.33  1115.90  9930.80  1855.00 8540.00
ARG  24 29  188.10  1253.14 0.55  37.99 0.08 1.20  1243.96  14292.60  16.23  1111.52  1876.49 18632.57  0.00  1.00 BRA  56 69  95.00  158.92 4.57  *24.43 0.46 0.37  10516.38  23199.80  388.06 803.25 24280.00 45261.38  0.99  12243.00 CHI  26 35  754.93  3315.58 4.10  12.99 0.78  1.71 4923.25  21932.54  22.14  96.08  7601.91 29643.89 245.00  382.33 COL  21 20  359.32  2171.64 5.39 27.95  0.97 1.73  1036.14 5107.24  3.43  23.40  1144.98  5681.19 343.00  811.77 HEX  52 62  462.19  2608.21 3.47  12.28 0.58  1.99 8828.23  66108.21  145.06  1806.25 13655.43  139060.77  2.30  3.12 VEN 13  17  147.85 523.61 8.80  15.63 1.89 1.61 1279.38 4997.28  12.26  95.73  1878.43  7599.70  38.30  78.16
WIG 15 24  33.82  64.43  5.61  8.98  1.16  1.74  397.69  796.97  0.10  0.72  752.72  1220.73  6.90  21.50 ZIM  . 17  . 384.76  . 2.03  . 0.31  . 267.97  . 0.44  . 627.63  . 5.48
Source: EMDB and authors'  calculations.
Note:  The first  colunm  under  each  heading  refers  to January,  1989 and  the second  to December  1992.  The  (double)  columns  are:  Level  of  the  IFC  index (1984  =  100),  IFC P/E-ratio,  IFC P/BV-ratio, IFC Market Capitalization, IFC Value Traded. Total Market Capitalization, and exchange rates (LC/S). The P/E ratios can be misleading in high inflation countnres (such as Argentina an Brazil in the late 1980s, as the carnings  are measured as the average flow over the last 12 months,  and prices are taken at the end of the period-,.  Similarly, P/BV ratios can be misleading in a highly inflationary environment.27
Table 3: Statistics  on the Index Rates of Return (1989-1992),  by Country.
(annual  percentage  changes)
CTRY  N  MEANCMG  STDCHG  MINCHG  MAXCHG  SKEWCHG  KURTCHG  AUTOCORR
IDN 35  -16.6  32.1  -250.6  224.9  0.18  0.12  0.25
IND  48  22.2  39.6  -292.6  423.2  0.60  0.92  0.17
KOR  48  -4.4  31.3  -230.9  319.0  0.94  1.23  -0.18
MAL  48  17.6  21.7  -186.8  155.9  -0.56  0.36  -0.10
PAK  48  28.7  31.0  -189.9  423.2  1.64  5.19  0.28
PHI  48  14.2  34.7  -351.6  325.0  -0.17  1.59  0.34
TAI  48  3.7  49.2  -409.6  359.5  0.14  0.18  0.18
THA  48  29.1  29.6  -270.0  201.7  -0.59  0.28  0.25
GRE  48  31.4  53.4  -206.8  702.9  1.83  4.01  0.13
JOR  48  11.8  20.2  -154.1  193.9  -0.18  0.93  -0.16
POR  48  -2.4  25.4  -170.1  348.3  1.34  4.31  0.06
TUR  48  33.6  70.5  -377.4  829.5  1.12  1.46  0.22
ARG  48  109.0  129.5  -779.4  2137.3  2.34  8.98  -0.12
BRA  48  41.8  83.4  -682.7  573.8  0.06  -0.14  -0.09
CHI  48  43.5  26.0  -109.7  255.4  0.24  -0.68  0.41
COL  48  53.4  39.6  -209.5  448.1  1.61  2.83  0.52
HEX  48  47.5  27.0  -170.1  235.9  -0.02  -0.37  0.16
VEN 48  48.1  54.1  -313.8  582.6  0.62  1.15  0.33
NIG  48  16.1  30.2  -507.1  226.0  -2.98  13.54  0.15
ZIM  35  -29.0  31.4  -276.6  180.4  -0.34  -0.42  0.29
Source: EMDB and authors' calculations.
Note: The monthly rates are multiplied  by 12 to obtain the yearly rates. The standard deviation  is
obtained by multiplying  the monthly standard  deviation  with the square root of 12.  N is number o
months, MEANCHG  refers to the mean change in the rate of return,  STDCHG to the standard
deviation  of the rate of return,  MINCHG  and MAXCHG  to the minimum  and maximum  change  i
the rate of return, SKEWCHG  to the skewness  coefficient, KURTCHG  to the kurtosis coefficient,
and AUTOCORR  to the first order autocorrelation. First observation  for Indonesia  and Zimbabwe
is January 1990.28
Table 4: Min  and max values (ranges) of cross-sectional values of monthly  time-series of rates of return  for aU stocks.
CTRY  YRS  AVL.  LMEAN-HNEAN  tSTD-NSTD  LMII-MRIN  LHAX-NIAX  LAUTOLAG-HAUTOLAG
IDN  90-92  90  -0.085  0.3U8  0.013  2.182  -0.776  -0.010  0.007  12.484  -0.838  0.569 IND  76-92  69  -0.005  0.078  0.074  0.386  -0.565  -0.131  0.265  2.910  -0.304  0.248
KMR  76-92  105  -0.027  0.057  0.054  0.223  -0.648  -0.071  0.084  1.342  -0.696  0.244 MAL  86-92  75  -0.028  0.072  0.045  0.332  -0.499  -0.069  0.109  2.037  -0.538  0.463
PAK  85-92  77  -0.046  0.096  0.040  0.263  -0.443  -0.062  0.069  1.093  -0.418  0.340 PHI  S5-92  34  -0.092  0.079  0.037  0.352  -0.593  -0.085  0.000  2.848  -0.350  0.478
TA!  85-92  77  -0.036  0.055  0.108  0.305  -0.725  -0.172  0.205  1.685  -0.260  0.271
TWA  ?6-92  58  -0.030  0.104  0.063  0.389  -0.517  -0.137  0.138  1.774  -0.448  0.366
CoE  76-92  34  -0.054  0.043  0.050  0.235  -0.497  -0.049  0.042  1.408  -0.310  0.416
JOR  78-92  30  -0.023  0.106  0.057  0.170  -0.468  -0.110  0.139  0.753  -0.374  0.250 POR  86-92  30  -0.051  0.066  0.074  0.324  -0.758  -0.124  0.118  1.885  -0.423  0.275
TUR  87-92  25  -0.084  0.094  0.140  0.389  -0.466  -0.251  0.241  2.274  -0.228  0.415
EtA  76-87  80  -0.091  0.208  0.117  0.753  -4.538  -0.180  0.000  3.628  -0.411  0.646 CHI  76-92  44  -0.017  0.075  0.097  0.348  -0.798  -0.109  0.213  3.011  -0.254  0.387 COL  85-92  22  -0.050  0.057  0.062  0.367  -0.  44  -0.103  0.000  3.209  -0.220  0.402 NEX  76-92  83  -0.046  0.099  0.019  0.501  -1.000  -0.012  0.064  3.695  -0.333  0.449
VE"  85-92  17  -0.016  0.075  0.144  0.316  -0.572  -0.301  0.273  1.955  -0.361  0.236
WIG  85-92  25  -0.051  0.057  0.093  0.174  -0.621  -0.392  0.145  0.784  -0.077  0.327
Zim  76-92  21  -0.097  0.048  0.107  0.250  -0.643  -0.040  0.130  1.239  -0.408  0.267
Source:  EMDB  and  authors'  calculations.
Notes:  Avail  is the number of stocks for  which  data are  available during  the period.  Lmeali i  the lowest mein  rate of return  for any
stock in a  market,  and  h mean the highest  rate  of retum.  Lstd is the lowest standard deviation  of the rates of return across  all stocks in a given market,  hstd the highest.  Lmin  is the  lowest minimum  rate of return across  all  stocks  in a given  market,  hmin is the highest
minimum rate of return  is a given market.  Similarly  for Imax and  hmax, the highest.  Autolag  is the  first autocorrelation,  with lautolag
the lowest  and hautolag  the highest  in a given  market.  No data on  individual  stock rate of return  were available  for Argentina.Table 5: Slope Coefficients for the Integration and Segmentation Tests
Integration  k2  I  Segmentation  S  R
2
N  >.  1  J  70,  2.
IND  18  0.0333  -0.0265  0.46  not  reject  0.0121  -0.1956  not  reject  0.46
(0.002)  (0.067)  (0.786)  (0.076)
KOR  22  -0.0106  0.0279  0.40  reject  0.1841  0.2604  not  reject  0.40
(0.144)  (0.0001)  (0.163)  (0.053)
MAL  29  0.0089  0.0154  0.37  reject  NC
(0.221)  (0.0001)
PAK  31  0.0132  0.0108  0.29  reject  -2.623  5.954  not  reject  0.28
(0.012)  (0.042)  (0.896)  (0.895)
PHI  16  -0.0243  0.0478  0.30  reject  0.0523  0.194  not  reject  0.29
(0.015)  (0.0001)  (0.335)  (0.079)
TAI  20  -0.0148  0.045  0.68  reject  -0.0674  0.490  not  reject  0.68
(0.107)  (0.0001)  (0.079)  (0.389)
THA  9  0.0560  0.0215  0.46  reject  0.211  0.546  not  reject  0.47
(0.036)  (0.003)  (0.525)  (0.301)
GRE  8  -0.035  0.0545  0.55  reject  -0.152  0.522  not  reject  0.56
(0.067)  (0.0001)  (0.605)  (0.418)
JOR  9  -0.0056  0.0092  0.18  not  reject  0.059  -0.362  not  reject  0.19
(0.460)  (0.203)  (0.586)  (0.575)
BRA  18  -0.002  0.0375  0.45  reject  -12.54  -8.798  not  reject  0.45
(0.799)  (0.0001)  (0.977)  (0.977)
CHI  22  0.0627  -.0024  0.37  not  reject  0.188  -2.020  not  reject  0.40
(0.005)  (0.877)  (0.744)  (0.489)
COL  20  0.0077  0.0435  0.33  reject  NC
(0.234)  (0.0001)
MEX  21  0.0227  0.0466  0.32  reject  0.158  -6.748  not  reject  0.32
(0.042)  (0.0001)  (0.941)  (0.927)
VEN  12  0.0100  0.0199  0.36  not  reject  0.0073  0.940  not  reject  0.36
(0.479)  (0.390)  (0.941)  (0.199)
NIG  14  1.196  -0.914  0.74  not reject  6.622  -5.914  not  reject  0.74
(0.808)  (0.807)  (0.962)  (0.961)
ZIM  10  0.0006  0.0059  0.22  not  reject  0.006  -0.030  not  reject  0.22
(0.969)  (0.805)  (0.673)  (0.176)
Source:  Authors' calculations.
Notes:  Approximate  p-values  (for  the  t-statistics)  are  in parentheses.  In  spite of  using  many  different  starting  values  for the
parameters,  an(d even  after  the  maximumii iterations  was  increased  up to 20(0) and  the convergenice  criteria  was raised  to 0.(0001,
nlo  convergcnce  (NC') was  obtained  I(or  Colombia  and  Malaysia  for  the  segimientation test.  RWs are  obtained  as  one  minus  the  ratio
of  suin of  squared  residual  (totalled  for all equations)  over  sum of  squared  totals  (totalled  for all equations).30
Table 6: Cross-sectional  analysis  of the Investabllity  Index  for each country
in January  1989,  June 1990,  and  December  1992
CTRY  DATE  NOSTOCKS  MEAN  STD  MAX  SKEWNESS
MAL  8901  62  0.84  0.34  1.00  -1.74136
PHI  8901  18  0.28  0.46  1.00  1.08486
THA  8901  29  0.30  0.20  1.00  1.14879
GRE  8901  26  0.31  0.47  1.00  0.88525
JOR  8901  25  0.10  0.20  0.49  1.59749
POR  8901  23  0.74  0.45  1.00  -1.16667
ARG  8901  24  0.58  0.50  1.00  -0.36103
BRA  8901  56  0.18  0.19  0.56  0.31331
CHI  8901  26  0.09  0.12  0.25  0.68705
MEX  8901  52  0.10  0.30  1.00  2.82184
MAL  9006  62  0.86  0.32  1.00  -2.03384
PHI  9006  29  0.22  0.41  1.00  1.43347
THA  9006  34  0.29  0.21  1.00  0.91982
GRE  9006  26  0.77  0.43  1.00  -1.35763
JOR  9006  25  0.10  0.20  0.49  1.59749
POR  9006  27  0.67  0.48  1.00  -0.75423
TUR  9006  18  0.89  0.32  1.00  -2.70579
ARG  9006  24  0.42  0.50  1.00  0.36103
BRA  9006  56  0.10  0.17  0.50  1.22881
CHI  9006  28  0.08  0.12  0.25  0.80870
MEX  9006  54  0.56  0.50  1.00  -0.23005
VEN  9006  13  0.38  0.51  1.00  0.53859
IDN  9212  63  0.26  0.25  0.49  -0.09769
IND  9212  62  0.15  0.12  0.24  -0.62193
KOR  9212  91  0.10  0.02  0.24  0.25280
HAL  9212  62  0.85  0.33  1.00  -1.87221
PAK  9212  58  0.09  0.28  1.00  3.02748
PHI  9212  30  0.25  0.43  1.00  1.24847
TAI  9212  70  0.03  0.00  0.05  -5.67578
THA  9212  51  0.27  0.16  0.50  -0.31587
GRE  9212  32  0.47  0.51  1.00  0.13149
JOR  9212  27  0.09  0.19  0.49  1.71783
POR  9212  30  0.38  0.48  1.00  0.56336
TUR  9212  25  0.80  0.41  1.00  -1.59749
ARG  9212  29  0.79  0.41  1.00  -1.52730
BRA  9212  69  0.53  0.47  1.00  -0.12553
CHI  9212  35  0.14  0.13  0.25  -0.17986
COL  9212  20  0.50  0.51  1.00  0.00000
MEX  9212  66  0.61  0.49  1.00  -0.44428
VEN  9212  17  0.41  0.51  1.00  0.39424
Source: EMDB and authors' calculations.
Notes: Statistics  provide the cross-sectional  distribution  of the investability  index at a
given point in time.  The cross-sectional  minimum  is 0.0 in all markets. No data were
available for Nigeria and Zimbabwe.31
Table 7:  Time-series  analysis of the cross-sectional  mean of
the investability  indexes
(December  1988 - March 1993)
CTRY  N  MEAN  STDMN  MINMN  MAXMN
IDN  31  0.20  0.07  0.10  0.37
IND  5  0.14  0.01  0.14  0.15
KOR  15  0.10  0.00  0.09  0.10
HAL  52  0.87  0.04  0.76  0.93
PAK  25  0.09  0.01  0.09  0.13
PHI  52  0.23  0.04  0.18  0.28
TAI  27  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.03
THA  52  0.28  0.02  0.23  0.30
GRE  52  0.56  0.19  0.31  0.77
JOR  52  0.10  0.01  0.08  0.13
POR  52  0.57  0.14  0.38  0.83
TUR  44  0.79  0.10  0.56  0.89
ARG  52  0.61  0.15  0.33  0.79
BRA  52  0.30  0.18  0.09  0.54
CHI  40  0.10  0.03  0.06  0.14
COL  26  0.38  0.12  0.2'  0.50
.iEX  52  0.47  0.21  0.10  0.80
VEN  39  0.41  0.03  0.31  0.44
Source: EMDB and authors' calculations.
Notes: The statistics  apply to the time series of the mean value of the investability  index for
a given market.  Chile has missing  data for 1991.32
Table 8: Times  Series  Summary of Cross-Sectional  Regressions of P/FRatio  against Investability  Index
(1989-12)
MNB  T  MNTS  P.  TP.  MNTfP  MNPj-R.  T0i,-P.  MNTPi-P.  MNMV  TMV  MNTMV
Malaysia  40.45  2.65  -0.04
Philippines  57.62  3.45  1.08
Thailand  5.1  3.83  0.64
Gnxec  28.31  3.06  1
Jordan  125.87  3.26  0.23
Bimal  9.18  1.94  0.12
Mexico  6.19  4.13  0.98
Malsysis  53.17  1.71  -0.06  37.44  0.78  0.23
Philippines  -52.22  -3.18  -0.28  54.88  2.87  -0.23
Tailand  -25.73  -8.52  1.01  10.99  9.02  1.44
Gmwce  140.18  1.85  0.76  -109.3  -1.63  -0.71
Josdan  4.2  1.02  -0.01  11.74  3.41  0.21
Brzil  7.33  2.17  0.3  -0.33  -0.48  -0.39
Mexico  11.69  3.6  0.38  -1.95  -0.76  0
Mabysia  71.11  1.62  -0.1  -17.9  -0.3  0.37
Philippincs  10.66  1.89  -0.24  -82.77  -3.05  -1.39
lailand  -9.53  -5.89  -0.31  11.9  7.71  1.94
Greec  288.19  1.64  0.21  236.21  1.56  -1.02
Jordan  26.31  2.24  -0.08  3.28  0.4  -0.45
Brail  20.58  2.33  0.55  -3.25  -4.92  -1.02
Mexico  9.75  4.77  0.48  -5.49  -2.08  -0.25
Malaysia  -2.3  -0.15  -0.17  -16.31  -2.73  0.31
Philippines  -38.41  -2.4  0.04  0.77  0.31  -0.77
Thailand  -13.47  -7.35  -0.47  1.29  4.6  0.55
Greec  -65.12  -1.55  0.28  60.61  1.81  0.17
Jordan  43.6  4.53  0.45  -6.58  -5.34  40.51
Brazil  -13.99  -2.27  -0.93  3.15  4.37  1.81
Mexico  10.46  2.67  0  0.07  0.05  0.6933
Table  8  Continued
MN i  T6  MNTS  A,  TX,6  MNTO_  MN)j3-j3.  T Pj-P6.  MNTPj-$.  MNMV  TMV  MNTMV
Malaysia  66.62  1.52  -0.08  16.33  0.34  0.37  -10.28  -0.16  0.51
Philippines  4.2  1.13  0.04  13.16  2.1  -0.75  -77.76  -3.04  -l.22
Tlailand  -18.4  -6.17  -0.58  4.51  4.36  0.41  9.38  6.2  1.11
Greece  370  1.71  0.35  -108.1  -1.68  -1.21  240.34  1.6  -1.06
Jordan  16.97  1.82  -0.02  31.29  3.03  0.21  14.94  1.29  -0.25
Brazil  10.43  2.22  0.67  -2.18  -3.36  -0.79  -3.92  -6.26  -1.39
Mexico  12.31  4.06  0.57  -4.34  -1.07  40.11  -5.56  -1.7  -0.45
Malaysia  22.94  0.97  -0.13  35.19  0.75  0.18  -7.15  -1.38  0.4
Philippines  17.06  2.33  0.28  85.15  2.97  0.07  -25.4  -3.32  -0.87
Thailand  -27.16  -8.59  -1.17  11.95  10.11  1.61  1.68  7.89  0.96
Greece  -35.86  -0.6  0.35  -32.24  -0.78  -0.45  51.08  1.71  0.16
Jordan  51.39  4.54  0.54  20.06  4.63  0.34  -9.28  -5.09  -0.57
Brazil  -0.23  -0.07  40.64  -0.01  -0.01  -0.29  2.29  7.1  2.01
Mexico  11.6  2.67  0.07  -1.96  -0.8  -0.18  0.14  0.11  0.64
Malaysia  25.87  0.71  -0.19  -19.77  -0.33  0.34  -16.92  -2.69  0.28
Philippines  21.82  3.12  0.32  -83.72  -3.08  -1.54  -4.14  -3.04  -0.95
Thailand  -10.64  -5.92  -0.4  11.85  7.19  1.58  -0.13  4.72  0.06
Greece  174.61  1.59  0.02  218.29  1.57  -0.86  47.36  1.79  -0.06
Jordan  32.21  4.07  0.49  3.94  0.47  40.53  -1.55  40.98  -0.55
Brazil  5.47  0.84  -0.34  -2.9  -3.09  -0.61  1.5  3.36  1.68
Mexico  10.57  2.91  0.09  -5.46  -1.91  40.44  40.62  -0.39  0.65
MalaysiA  35.48  0.97  -0.16  14.46  0.31  0.34  -10.87  -0.16  0.51  -7.93  -1.45  0.34
Philippines  39  3.06  0.47  32.96  2.62  -0.41  -74.07  -2.99  -1.22  -14.25  -3.19  -0.8
Thailand  -21.33  -6.18  -0.71  6.46  4.37  0.57  8.23  4.56  0.57  0.5  1.99  0.34
Greece  235.3  1.68  0.06  -53.95  -1.24  -0.75  227.95  1.63  -0.84  35.29  1.71  0.11
Jordan  32.15  3.51  0.53  37.82  3.68  0.34  16.36  1.43  -0.35  -3.63  -1.89  -0.55
Bra-il  5.88  0.91  -0.19  -1.37  -2.13  -0.7  -3.02  -3.12  -0.89  1.51  3.29  1.45
Mexico  12.47  2.93  0.23  -4.31  -1.13  -0.22  -5.73  -1.68  -0.62  -0.17  -0.11  0.67
Source: Authors'  calculations.
Notes: 'MN'  stands foir the time-series mean of the cross-sectional regression coefficients.  -Std'  represents the standard deviation of the cross-sectional  regrsinon
coefficients.  'T'  stands  for the t-value of the mean of the times-series of coefficients,  i.e.,  mean*sqrt(n)Istd. 'MN T'  stands for the mean of the t-values of thc individual
cross-sectional  regressions.  We use stocks with complete observations from 1186 through 12/92.  'MV'  are one month lagged log market values.  ''  stan  for the
investability index.  '3_'  are world betas. '(,-  are the betas against the local index and '.'  are the betas from the mimicking portfol os.  For the number of socks.  soc
Tab!e 6 on the investability index.  Results are similar when using local betas and betas from mimicking portfolios separately rather than taking the difference  ween  them.34
Table  9; runes Series Sumunary of Cross-Sectional  Regressions of Rates of Return  apinst  lvesability  Jaxm
(1989-1992)
MN  T  MNT*  P.  TP.  MNTp,,  Pj-P.  Tp,-p.  MNTp,.  M NV  T MV  MNTMV Malaysia  0.02  1.77  0.13
Philippines  0.02  1.7  0.35
Thailand  0.13  4.28  0.48
Greeco  0.03  2.3  0.55
Jordas  40.03  -2.05  -0.2
Brazil  0.02  0.68  0.14
Mexico  0.01  1.08  0.1
Malaysia  0.02  1.48  0.09  -0.01  -0.7  -0.16
Philippines  0.02  1.94  0.42  0  -0.1  -0.08
Thailand  0.1  2.82  0.44  -0.02  -0.69  -0.12
Greecc  0.03  2.2  0.59  0  0.35  0.18
Jordan  -0.04  -1.98  -0.22  0.03  1.86  0.25
Brazil  0  40.08  -0.01  -0.03  -2.08  -0.28
Mexico  0.01  0.91  0.06  0.01  1.01  0.27
Malaysia  0.02  1.65  0.12  0.01  0.91  0.02
Philippines  0.02  2  0.41  -0.01  -0.98  -0.34
Thailand  0.12  3.19  0.44  0  40.14  0
Greece  0.02  1.82  0.6  -0.01  -0.86  -0.11
Jordan  -0.02  -1.09  -0.16  0.03  1.56  0.02
Brazil  0.04  0.89  0.08  4.01  40.6  -0.05
Mexico  0.02  1.41  0.16  40.01  -1.65  -0.3
Malaysia  0.01  1.49  0.12  0  -1  0.11 Philippines  0.03  2.69  0.29  0  40.71  40.01 Tlailand  0.13  3.83  0.46  0  0.69  0.18 Greecc  0.03  2.02  0.43  0  -0.54  -0.14 Jordan  0  0.06  0.01  -0.01  -0.93  40.09 Brazil  0.02  0.57  0.06  0  0.12  0.1 Mexico  0  -. 36  -0.11  0.01  2.04  0.4735
Table  9  Continued
MN6  T6  MNTS  8,  T  MNTW  p-p  T P-P.  MNT JP-p,  MMV  TMV  MNTMV
Malaysa  0.02  1.46  0.09  0  40.11  -0.08  0.01  0.69  -0.02
Philippines  0.03  2.32  0.47  40.01  -0.69  40.15  0  -0.15  -0.21
Tbailand  0.1  2.28  0.32  -0.03  -0.95  -0.08  0.01  0.32  -0.08
Greeoe  0.03  1.75  0.55  0  -0.2  0.15  -0.01  -0.55  -0.01
Jordan  40.02  -1.38  -0.13  0.05  3.25  0.29  0.05  2.61  0.2
Brazil  0.02  0.45  0  -0.03  -2.26  -0.18  -0.02  -1.51  -0.2
Mexico  0.01  0.96  0.15  0.02  1.26  0.34  -0.01  -1.42  -0.38
Malaysia  0.01  1.27  0.1  0  -0.01  -0.05  0  -1.07  0.09
Philippimes  0.04  2.97  0.39  0.01  0.67  0  40.01  -1.15  I0.05
Tbailand  0.09  2.22  0.46  -0.01  -0.33  -0.13  0  0.67  0.05
Groom  0.05  2.74  0.59  0.02  1.14  0.33  -4.01  -1.75  -0.31
Jordan  0.02  0.67  0.09  0.04  2.05  0.34  -0.01  -1.59  -0.19
Erzil  -0.01  -0.23  -0.06  -0.03  -1.97  -0.28  0  0.27  0.07
Mexico  -0.01  -0.5S  -0.15  0.02  1.08  0.31  0.01  2.22  0.49
Malysia  0.01  1.34  0.12  0.02  1.14  0.05  0  -1.01  0.11
Philippines  0.03  3.03  0.37  40.01  -1.11  -0.35  0  -0.76  40.05
Thailand  0.11  2.79  0.4  -0.01  -0.26  -0.13  0  -. 07  0.03
Greee  0.03  2.02  0.64  -0.02  -1.15  -0.32  -0.01  -1.01  40.33
Jordu  -0.01  -0.19  0.06  0.02  1.09  -0.06  0  -0.21  -0.11
Bkazil  -0.03  -0.77  -0.07  0  0.36  0.05  0.01  0.48  0.08
Mexico  0  -0.14  -0.06  -0.02  -2.47  40.39  0.01  2.39  0.52
Malaysia  0.01  1.24  0.1  0  0.37  0.01  0.01  0.87  0.02  C  -1.11  0.09
Philippines  0.04  3.36  0.4S  0  0.14  -0.06  0  -0.11  -0.18  -0.01  -1.14  -0.05
Tlhsiland  0.04  0.72  0.2  0.01  0.31  0  -0.01  -0.2  40.3  0  0.46  0.04
Greee  0.04  2.35  0.67  0.01  0.35  0.19  -0.02  -0.72  -0.15  -0.01  -1.91  -0.46
Jord  0.01  0.4  0.15  0.06  3.17  0.37  0.05  2.35  0.14  -0.01  -1.01  -0.21
fnail  -0.01  40.36  -0.06  -0.02  -1.85  -0.12  -0.01  -0.69  -0.09  0  0.08  0
Mexico  -0.01  -0.49  40.11  0.02  1.31  0.39  40.02  -1.38  -0.43  0.01  2.44  0.54
Seugc: Autbrs'  calculations.
Notes: 'MN'  stnds  for the tine-series  memmi  of the cs-sectional  regression coeffcients.  'Sud'  reprnts  dhe standard deviation of the crosssetional  egression
coefficients.  T  stands  for the t-value of the mean  of the  times-series  of coefficients,  i.e.,  mean*sqrt(n)IsId.  'MN  T'  stands  for the mean  of the  t-values  of the individual
cross-sectional  regressions. We use  stocks  with complete  observations  from 1/86  through 12/92. 'MV'  are  one month lagged  log market  values.  '6  stands  for the
invesuability  index.  '0_'  are world betas. 'e'  are the betas  against  the local  index and 'P.'  are the  betas  from the miimicking  porifolios.  For the number  of stocks,  sec
Table 6 on the invesability index.  Results  are simildr when using local betas  and betas  f  rom ruinicking portifolios  separalely  rather  than  taking the diffcrcnec  betwee the.36
Table 10:  Tunes  Series  Sunniary of Cross-Sectional  Regressions  of Standardized  P/FRatio against  Investability  Index
(I989-1 "2)
MN&  T 6  MNT6  MN P  Tfi.  MN T p_  MN  j-p  T  Pj-P.  MN T 0-P.  MN MV  TMV  MNTMV
Malaysa  1.95  2.94  -0.04
Philippines  3.92  3.5  1.08
Thailand  0.35  3.2  0.64
Gnrce  1.9  3.7  1
Jordon  10.13  3.38  0.23
Brazil  1.72  3.03  0.21
Mexico  0.63  4.31  0.98
Malaysia  2.43  1.8  -0.06  2.68  1.37  0.23
Phdippiune  -3.54  -3.23  -0.28  3.64  2.85  40.23
Thailand  -1.94  -3.34  -1.01  0.81  9.76  1.44
Grece  8.17  1.95  0.76  -6.43  -1.68  -0.71
Jordan  0.39  1.07  -0.01  1.16  3.61  0.21
Brazil  0.58  2.07  0.34  0.01  0.25  -0.24
Mexico  1.2  2.93  0.38  -0.36  -1.24  0
Malaysia  3.13  1.59  -0.1  -0.86  -0.32  0.37
Philippines  0.67  1.74  -0.24  -5.62  -3.07  -1.39
Thiailad  -0.7  -6.04  -0.31  0.86  8.43  1.94
Greece  15.95  1.71  0.21  13  1.61  -1.02
Jordsn  2.54  2.37  -0.08  0.55  0.75  -0.45
Brzil  1.03  2.69  0.59  -0.3  -5.6  -1.02
Mexico  0.37  3.65  0.4S  40.29  -1.14  -0.25
Malysia  -0.04  40.05  -0.17  -0.7  -2.79  0.31
Philippines  -2.59  -2.38  0.04  0.03  0.15  -o.77
Tlilnd  -0."  -7.69  -0.47  0.09  4.79  0.55
Greece  -3.36  -1.47  0.28  3.36  1.82  0.17
Jordon  3.69  3.89  0.45  -0.53  -4.6  -0.51
Brazil  -2.49  -2.38  -0.68  0.4  3.33  1.36
Mexico  1.07  2.25  0  40.02  40.  1  0.6937
Table 10  Continued
MN6  T6  MNT4  MNI,6  TI_  MNT_  MNPj-I.  Tp6j-P.  MNTPj-1.  MNMV  TMV  MNTMV
Malaysia  3.05  1.54  -0.08  1.66  0.83  0.37  -0.65  -0.22  0.51
Phtlippines  0.28  1.11  0.04  0.81  1.92  -0.75  -5.29  -3.06  -1.22
Thailand  -1.41  -5.93  -0.58  0.34  4.28  0.41  0.67  6.63  1.11
Greece  20.83  1.78  0.35  -6.32  -1.67  -1.21  13.39  1.67  -1.06
Jordan  1.61  1.91  -0.02  3.12  3.07  0.21  1.69  1.56  -0.25
Brazil  1.04  2.61  0.71  -0.2  -3.5  -0.69  40.4  -7.26  -1.34
Mexico  1.22  3.16  0.57  -0.74  -1.54  -0.11  40.22  -0.67  -0.45
Malaysia  1.17  1.12  -0.13  2.61  1.35  0.18  -0.32  -1.43  0.4
Philippines  1.13  2.34  0.28  5.67  2.97  0.07  -1.72  -3.4  -0.87
Thailand  -2.05  -8.44  -1.17  0.9  10.34  1.61  0.13  8.45  0.96
Greece  -1.41  -0.45  0.35  -2.16  -0.9  -0.45  2.81  1.76  0.16
Jordan  4.41  3.94  0.54  1.84  4.31  0.34  -0.79  -4.44  -0.57
Brazil  40.28  -0.99  -0.39  0.06  1.19  40.12  0.24  8.24  1.67
Mexico  1.23  2.31  0.07  -0.36  -1.37  -0.18  0  0.02  0.64
Malaysia  1.22  0.74  -0.19  -0.95  -0.35  0.34  -0.74  *2.71  0.23
Philippines  1.5  3.16  0.32  -5.69  -3.11  -1.54  -0.31  -3.44  -0.95
Thailand  -0.78  -6.11  -0.4  0.84  7.94  1.58  -0.01  -0.49  0.06
Greece  9.69  1.68  0.02  11.98  1.61  -0.86  2.64  1.79  -0.08
Jordan  2.57  3.43  0.49  0.66  0.88  -0.53  -0.04  -0.29  -0.55
Brazil  0.26  0.47  -0.12  -0.22  -2.99  -0.65  0.19  5.51  1.38
Mexico  1.04  2.39  0.09  -0.28  -I  -0.44  -0.12  -0.64  0.65
Malaysia  1.7  1.04  -0.16  1.59  0.82  0.34  -0.69  -0.23  0.51  -0.35  -1.49  0.34
Philippines  2.66  3.09  0.47  2.16  2.56  -0.41  -5.05  -3.01  -1.22  -0.98  -3.31  -0.8
Thailand  -1.66  -5.86  -0.71  0.52  4.29  0.57  0.57  4.7  0.57  0.05  2.48  0.34
Greece  13.53  1.76  0.06  -3.37  -1.25  -0.75  12.7  1.69  -0.84  1.93  1.77  0.11
Jordar  2.59  2.92  0.53  3.59  3.48  0.34  1.8  1.67  -0.35  40.25  -1.46  -0.55
Brazil  0.44  0.79  0.07  -0.07  -1.37  -0.51  -0.29  -3.9  -0.96  0.16  4.4  1.1
Mexico  1.29  2.47  0.23  -0.73  -1.63  -0.22  -0.23  -0.68  -0.62  -0.05  -0.29  0.67
Source:  Authors'  calculations.
Notes:  'MN  stands for the time-series mean of the cross-sectional regression coefficients.  T  stands for the t-value of the mean of the times-series of coefficients,  i.e..
mean4sqrt(n)istd.  MN T  stands for the mean of the t-values of the individual cross-sectional regressions.  We use stocks with complete observations from  1)86 through
12/92.  MV-  are one month lagged log market values.  W slands for the investability index.  'J,  are world betas.  *j  arc the betas against the local index mad B.
are the betas  from the mirmicking  portfolios.  For the number of stocks,  see Table 6 on the investability index.38
Table  11: Times  Series Suntmary  of Cross-Sectional  Regressions  of  P/E-Ratio  and  Rates of Return agaimt  lnaatability  had'  aNd Sed,  Dmmy
|Pand A: PIE Ratio
MN A  T 6  MN  T p,,  P.  T p-fp.  MN MV  T MN MV  MN SEC  T SEC Malaysia  11.40  1.21 
-19.39  -0.94 Brazil  2.14  0.59 
-2.2  -1.53
Malaysia  27.12  1.01  23.03  0.46  -12.43  -0.53 Brazil  10.54  2.34  -1.6  -1.83  -7.58  -2.98
Malaysia  35.20  1.17  -2.22  -0.04  -21.19  -0.89 Brazil  10.69  2.32  -4.25  -8.5  3.01  1.13
Malaysia  -53.37  -2.66  -19.43  -2.77  -31.08  -1.33 Brazil  -11.68  -1.78  3.19  4.2  -2.98  -1.71
Malaysia  33.16  0.93  1.52  0.03  2.27  0.04  -15.5  -0.55 Brazil  10.62  2.25  -3.45  -2.87  -5.10  -8.84  -1.47  -0.42
Malaysia  -17.74  -0.65  19.03  0.39  -9.17  -1.49  -19.5  -0.77 Brazil  2.86  0.60  -1.22  -i.33  2.24  7.05  -9.74  -2.45
Malaysia  -34.04  -1.13  -2.56  -0.04  -20.54  -2.74  -33.94  -1.26 Brzil  6.62  0.96  -3.19  -2.71  1.49  2.93  -3.86  -0.73
Malaysia  -14.42  -0.41  -1.47  -0.03  3.02  0.04  -10.45  -1.55  -23.48  -0.76 Brazil  6.92  1.02  -2.87  -2.39  -3.74  -3.04  -1.59  3.06  -14.2  -2.2439
Table 11 Coatimue
Pand  B: Rates of Retumn
MNI  T A  MNPW  T  P,-P.  Tpj-*  MN MV  T MV  MN SEC  T SEC
Malysia  0.03  1.27  0.01  0.47
Brail  0.02  0.69  -0.00  -0.12
Malaysia  0.03  1.04  0.00  -0.30  0.00  0.46
Brazil  0.02  0.37  -0.03  -1.29  -0.03  -0.58
Malaysia  0.02  1.17  0.00  0.44  0.00  0.38
Brazil  0.05  1.16  -0.03  -1.62  0.05  0.6B
Malaysia  0.02  1.01  0.00  -0.S1  0.00  0.25
Brazil  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.30  0.01  0.24
Malaysia  0.03  1.04  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.25  0.01  0.41
Brazil  0.04  0.81  -0.03  -1.39  -0.04  -1.73  0.04  0.55
Malysia  0.02  0.31  0.00  0.23  0.00  0.96  0.00  0.22
Brazil  -0.01  -0.31  -0.02  -0.94  0.00  0.44  -0.03  -0.49
Maaysia  0.02  0.78  0.01  0.40  0.01  0.49  0.00  -. 99  0.00  0.12
Brazil  -0.02  -0.54  0.01  0.41  0.01  0.61  40.03  -0.43
Malysia  0.02  0.78  0.01  0.40  0.01  0.49  -0.00  0.99  0.00  0.12
Brazil  -0.00  -0.10  -0.02  -1.22  -0.01  -0.38  0.00  0.00  .4.05  -0.56
Souewe:  Ahsn  cakulatios.
Notes:  MN  stands  for the tim  _series  mmt of the crssectional  regression  coefficients.  T  stands  for the I-value of the mn  of the times-series  of coefficients, i.e.,
meansqr((n)istd.  We use  stocks  with compldc observations  from 1186  through 12/92. *MV  are one month lagged  log msrket values.  -r  stands  for the investability
index.  'P,  are world bets.  are the betas  against  the local index and ',.  are she  betas  from the mimicking portfolios.  SEC  stimds for the sectorl  dummy.  For
ihe  number  of  stocks,  aw Table 6 oe the inveLtbility  index.  Results  are similar when using  local betas  and betas  from mimicking portfolios separately  ratber than  taking
the differe-cc betwee them.40
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